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Vietnamese Security Researchers

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A list of Vietnamese professors, PhD students, and researchers who are working on Information Security (beside me of course), in no particular order

# Name Job Homepage Description
1 Anh Le PhD student, UC Irvine http://www.ics.uci.edu/~anhml/index.html IDS & IPS, load balancing
2 Tien Nguyen Ast Prof http://www.ece.iastate.edu/~tien/ Mostly configuration management & software engineering, some security
3 Minh Le PhD student, U of Virginia to be added
4 Hung Tran PhD student, U of Iowa http://www.hungviettran.info/ Privacy Preserving Data Mining, Access Control withXACM

 

Last Updated on Sunday, 13 September 2009 22:18
 

Above the clouds - An introduction to cloud computing

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The cloud

Cloud computing is a new and emerging area, so new that each person can have his own definition of what "cloud computing" is. 

In their paper Above the Clouds: A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing a group from Berkeley explains their definition, and discusses the benefits as well as the challenges that cloud computing brings. 

You can find my slide set for this topic here: Cloud Computing Infrastructurepptpptx

Beside discussing the mentioned above paper, I also include a brief description of Amazon EC2 and Google AppEngine, two of the biggest cloud providers currently in the market. 

Last Updated on Sunday, 08 March 2009 01:07
 

BitUnlocker

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This is some interesting research from the folks at Princeton in which they show that DRAM retains data after the computer has been powered off. Taking advantage of this, and the fact that disk encryption key is stored in memory, they can plugin a usb drive while your computer is on (even in locked or sleep mode), boot their OS stored in the usb drive, dump your memory, and steal your disk encryption key which resides on DRAM. 

This attack is hard to defend in the sense that it takes advantage of a physical characteristic of DRAM: the content is not erased immediately after the memory chip  is powered off. You can not rely on the OS to do the erasing job because the attacker can turn off the machine by unplugging power cable. Also, the disk encryption key must reside in memory in order to be used.

The best defense mechanism that I can think of now is to store disk encryption key in a memory location which will be erased right after the machine is booted up... some location that will be used temporary by BIOS for example.

 

 
The project's website: http://citp.princeton.edu/memory/ 
Last Updated on Saturday, 07 March 2009 06:16
 



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